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How should the contingent liabilities of a sovereign be treated 
in a general restructuring of the debts of that sovereign?  This question has 
played only a minor role in past sovereign debt restructurings because the 
size of such contingent liabilities has in most cases been small.  In recent 
years, however, slathering government guarantees on third party debt has 
become the tool of choice for many countries in their efforts to quell an 
incipient panic in their financial markets.  Some of those sovereigns are now, 
or may soon be, in the position of needing to restructure their debts.  Ignoring 
large contingent liabilities in a sovereign debt restructuring may plant a land 
mine on the road to debt sustainability once the restructuring closes.  That 
said, the answers to the questions of whether and how to restructure 
contingent liabilities are not obvious.  Is the restructurer to assume that 
some, all or none of those contingent liabilities will eventually wind up as 
direct claims against the sovereign?  Even if the underlying instrument can 
be successfully restructured, the guarantee will typically stand as an 
independent obligation of the guarantor that will require separate treatment in 
the restructuring. 
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How should the contingent liabilities of sovereigns (like 
government guarantees of the debts of State-owned enterprises or even 
private sector entities) be treated in a general restructuring of the debt of that 
sovereign?   This question has played only a minor role in the sovereign debt 
restructurings of the last thirty years because the aggregate size of such 
contingent liabilities -- in comparison to the overall debt stocks -- has in most 
cases been very small.2   Slathering explicit government guarantees on third 
party obligations, however, has recently become the tool of choice for many 
countries in their efforts to quell an incipient panic in their financial markets.3  
In addition, implicit government guarantees (the warm-arm-wrapped-over-
the-shoulder; the wink; the nod; the unvoiced “all will be well in the end” 
glance in the direction of the creditors) are now ubiquitous.  Systemically 
important financial institutions, state-owned or sponsored enterprises and 
sub-sovereign political units may all borrow under the shadow of an implicit 
sovereign guarantee.  Inevitably, some of those sovereigns will need to 
restructure their own debts one day and this component of their balance 
sheets, or perhaps better said their off balance sheets, will need to be 
addressed.  
                                            
1
 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (New York) and Duke University School of Law, 
respectively.  For comments, thanks to Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Carlos Esposito, Anna 
Gelpern, Yuefen Li, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, and Ignacio Tirado. 
2
 The primary treatises that address sovereign restructurings devote little attention to the 
matter of how to restructure sovereign guarantees.  See, e.g., Mauro Megliani, SOVEREIGN 
DEBT: GENESIS-RESTRUCTURING- LITIGATION (2012 draft; on file with authors); Rodrigo 
Olivares-Caminal, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2010); Philip R. 
Wood, INTERNATIONAL BONDS, LOANS, GUARANTEES, LEGAL OPINIONS (2007). 
3
 Our primary source for data on this topic is a 2012 Report by Houlihan Lokey, available at 
the website of the Institute for International Finance (http://www.iif.com/events/recent/); see 
also Dalvinder Singh & John Raymond Labrosse, Developing a Framework for Effective 
Financial Crisis Management, 2 OECD J. (2012) (reporting data on the increase in 
contingent liabilities in the EU as a function of the 2007 financial crisis). 
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This problem is not limited to sovereigns.  States, provinces 
and municipalities can also issue guarantees, often with little or no public 
awareness that the local taxpayer’s credit has been engaged to repay the 
debt until it is too late.4 
The Motivations 
 
The traditional motivation for issuing a sovereign guarantee is 
to allow the beneficiary to piggy-back on the credit standing of the sovereign.  
Entities that could not by themselves borrow in the credit market, or a project 
that would not, on a stand-alone basis, have been bankable, are thus given 
access to financing at tolerably low interest rates.  The alternatives for the 
sovereign often boil down to two -- finance the enterprise/project through a 
sovereign borrowing followed by a relending to the enterprise/project, or 
wrap a sovereign guarantee around a direct borrowing by the debtor.  The 
former places the liability squarely on the shoulders and the balance sheet of 
the sovereign, driving up debt-to-GDP ratios and requiring compliance with 
legal restrictions (such a statutory debt ceilings) on sovereign borrowing.  
The latter can often be accomplished off-balance sheet and outside the 
ambit of legal restrictions. 
The dangers of unrestricted sovereign guarantees, and the 
need for greater transparency in governmental accounting for these 
arrangements, are gradually receiving more attention.  UNCTAD’s recently 
issued Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing 
expressly address the problem. Principle 11 states: 
Disclosure and publication 
Relevant terms and conditions of a financing agreement should 
be disclosed by the sovereign borrower, be universally 
available, and be freely accessible in a timely manner through 
online means to all stakeholders, including citizens. Sovereign 
debtors have a responsibility to disclose complete and accurate 
information on their economic and financial situation that 
conforms to standardized reporting requirements and is 
relevant to their debt situation. Governments should respond 
openly to requests for related information from relevant parties. 
                                            
4
 See Mary William Walsh, Crushed by Promises -- Bonds Arranged in Obscurity Return to 
Haunt Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES, B1, B6, June 26, 2012: 
The “full faith and taxing power” of communities, a solemn 
pledge, was being used to guarantee revenue bonds for 
non-essentials like solar-power projects, apartment 
buildings and a soccer stadium -- things bailout weary 
taxpayers might walk away from if the guarantees were 
called. 
  4  
[NEWYORK 2668454_3] 
Legal restrictions to disclosing information should be based on 
evident public interest and to be used reasonably. 
And Implication 3 to Principle 11 explains: 
Debtors should make public disclosure of their financial and 
economic situation, providing among others the following 
information: (i) accurate and timely fiscal data; (ii) level and 
composition of external and domestic sovereign debt including 
maturity, currency, and forms of indexation and covenants; (iii) 
external accounts; (iv) the use of derivative instruments and 
their actual market value; (v) amortization schedules and, (vi) 
details of any kind of implicit and explicit sovereign guarantees. 
Sovereign borrowers may wish to consider disclosing 
information by way of international norms, such as the IMF’s 
Special Data Dissemination Standard.5 
The European Union Council issued a Directive in 2011 with 
this text: 
For all sub-sectors of general government, 
Member States shall publish relevant information 
on contingent liabilities with potentially large 
impacts on public budgets, including government 
guarantees, non-performing loans, and liabilities 
stemming from the operation of public 
corporations, including the extent thereof. 
 Member States shall also publish information on 
the participation of general government in the 
capital of private and public corporations in 
respect of economically significant amounts.6 
The Eurozone financial crisis that started in 2009 added a new 
twist on the motivation for sovereign guarantees.  Some of the Eurozone 
peripheral countries like Greece began to experience heavy outflows of bank 
deposits.  The resources of the local central banks were unable to supply 
adequate liquidity to the banking systems.  The solution?  Local banks would 
                                            
5
 UNCTAD, 2012 Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, 
Principle 11 (Disclosure and Reporting), Implication 3 (emphasis added).  Other principles 
also touch upon the issue, such as Principle 4 (Responsible Credit Decisions), Implication 3 





 See Council Directive on 8 November 2011 on Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks of 
the Member States (November 23, 2011, Article 14, Part 3).   
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issue debt instruments to themselves, obtain a government guarantee and 
then use the instruments as collateral for loans from the European Central 
Bank.  The sovereign guarantee in this context does not serve the 
conventional purpose of persuading a creditor to lend to an otherwise credit-
impaired debtor; after all, in these situations the creditor and the debtor are 
the same entity -- the issuing bank.  The guarantee is simply a passport into 
the ECB discount window.7 
The Challenge 
 
  The central problem with contingent liabilities is that they are 
contingent.  Neither the beneficiary of the guarantee (the creditor) nor the 
sovereign guarantor will ordinarily know at the outset whether the primary 
obligor (the borrower) will eventually be able to repay the debt on its own.8  
 
  Therein lies the challenge for the sovereign debt restructurer.  If 
one forces the beneficiary to call on the sovereign guarantee as a means of 
bringing the liability into the main restructuring in order to treat it in a manner 
identical to other debts, the sovereign may be taking on its own shoulders a 
liability that, left on its own, would never have emerged from the cocoon of 
contingency.  Why?   Because the primary obligor may have paid it at 
maturity without government assistance.  
 
Leaving large contingent liabilities out of the main debt 
restructuring, however, may plant a land mine on the road to debt 
sustainability once the restructuring closes. Is the restructurer to assume that 
(i) some, (ii) all or (iii) none of those contingent liabilities will eventually wind 
up as direct claims against the sovereign?   The answer to that question may 
dramatically affect whether the main debt restructuring will achieve its 
primary aim of returning the country to a sustainable debt position. 
    
For its part, the creditor/beneficiary of a state guarantee has a 
right to feel more aggrieved about being dragged into a sovereign debt 
                                            
7
 See ECB Caps Use of State-Backed Bonds as Collateral, REUTERS, July 3, 2012, available 
at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/uk-ecb-collateral-idUKBRE8620V920120703; 
Sonia Sirletti & Elisa Martinussi, Italy Banks Said to Use State-Backed Bonds for ECB 
Loans, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 21, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-
20/italian-banks-are-said-to-use-state-guaranteed-bonds-to-receive-ecb-loans.html 
8
 But sometimes they will know.  In the Greek debt restructuring of 2012 described below, for 
example, 36 bonds guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic (but only 36 out of hundreds of 
state-guaranteed obligations) were declared eligible to participate in the restructuring of the 
Republic’s debt.  One criterion used in selecting these bonds was a general recognition that 
the primary obligors did not have the capacity to service the debts out of their own 
resources.  For details on the Greek restructuring, including regarding the guaranteed 
bonds, see Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt 
Exchange: An Autopsy (2012 draft), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144932 
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restructuring than does a direct creditor of the State.  The beneficiary of such 
a guarantee by definition holds "two name paper"; the beneficiary enjoys the 
credit of both the State and the primary obligor.  By roping the beneficiary of 
a State guarantee into a debt workout, the additional credit protection 
resulting from the independent obligation of the primary obligor to pay the 
debt is lost.   
The Options 
There are at least four possible ways of treating explicit 
contingent liabilities in a debt restructuring of the sovereign: 
1. Ignore them.   Under this approach, the sovereign deals only with 
guarantees that are actually called by the beneficiary before the debt 
restructuring closes.  No pressure is put on beneficiaries to call the 
guarantees; no effort is made to force the liabilities into the 
restructuring. 
2. Entice them.   The sovereign may declare that paper bearing its 
guarantee will be eligible to be tendered in the restructuring 
transaction.  Naturally, this leaves it in the discretion of the holders 
whether to tender now or wait and take their chances when the 
scheduled maturity date of the paper arrives.  The sovereign may 
attempt to entice holders into the restructuring by offering them a 
small premium over the consideration being offered to direct creditors.  
Such a sweetner can be justified as the consideration paid to the 
beneficiary of a State guarantee in return for the beneficiary’s release 
of the primary obligor. 
3. Pressure the beneficiaries to call.  Careening to the other extreme, the 
sovereign debtor could attempt to pressure the beneficiaries to call on 
their State guarantees in order to bring the resulting -- now actual, no 
longer contingent -- liabilities into the sovereign’s debt restructuring.  
Presumably, this could only be done by threatening to repudiate any 
post-closing call of the guarantee.  In the case of guarantees that are 
governed by the law of the sovereign’s own jurisdiction (and our 
research suggests that a surprising number of Eurozone sovereign 
guarantees specify local law for the guarantee even where the 
underlying instrument is governed by foreign law), pressure can be 
applied by passing a law mandating the terms on which the guarantee 
will be settled. 
4. Call or don't call; you will receive the same consideration.   The fourth 
option is to tell beneficiaries that they are free to call or not as they 
choose, but if they elect to call on the State guarantee after the debt 
restructuring closes, the sovereign will honor it by delivering 
consideration having a net present value equal to what the creditor 
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would have received had the claim been brought into the main 
restructuring.  
The Problems 
Each of these options has its own set of problems.  
Leaving the guarantees out of a restructuring altogether 
(Option 1) places the sovereign at risk that the financial predicates 
underlying the debt restructuring could be undone.  A large slug of liabilities 
coming onto the balance sheet of the sovereign unexpectedly in the future 
could render obsolete the debt sustainability analysis upon which the 
financial terms of the main restructuring was based.  This is a risk both to the 
sovereign debtor and to the other creditors that join the restructuring.9  
But forcing the beneficiaries to call on the explicit guarantees 
(Option 4), even if legally possible (which it probably won't be), compels the 
beneficiaries to give up their claims on the primary obligors.   As noted 
above, this works a special hardship on guaranteed creditors in comparison 
with their direct creditor counterparts.  
Enticing the beneficiaries to join the restructuring by offering 
them a sweetner (Option 2) may bring in some of the beneficiaries, but 
probably not all of them unless the sweetener is embarrassingly sweet. 
                                            
9
 The existence of guarantees that pop up after a debt restructuring has closed can be an 
embarrassment, or worse, for the debtor country.  This happened in Belize shortly after that 
country’s debt restructuring closed in 2007.  See Belize Bank: A $10 m Mystery, THE 
ECONOMIST, May 15, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/node/11377008.  A 
heated scandal ensued.  Local activists in Belize sought to block payments on the guarantee 
(which had quickly become direct obligations of the sovereign because the underlying 
obligor was unable to pay).  The creditor, Belize Bank, however, took the position that it was 
entitled to full payment and the Government subsequently conceded this in arbitration 
proceedings in the United Kingdom.   
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Finally, telling beneficiaries that they will receive the same 
consideration in settlement of their guarantees regardless of when they may 
call on those guarantees (Option 3) may not be a credible threat.  If things 
begin to improve in the debtor country after the restructuring closes, will the 
government really be eager to default on an item of guaranteed debt soon 
thereafter?  Probably not. 
The Practice 
 
There has been no consistent practice in previous sovereign 
debt restructurings on this issue.  The workouts of commercial bank 
sovereign loans in the 1980s generally followed Option 1 above.  
Beneficiaries were not required, nor even encouraged, to call on their 
sovereign guarantees.10  
In its 2012 debt restructuring, Greece invited, but did not 
attempt to coerce, holders of a small segment of State guaranteed debt to 
participate in the restructuring (Option 2).  See “The Greek Case” below. 
When the Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative got under way 
in the mid 1990s, the HIPC rules required that all contingent liabilities of the 
debtor countries be brought into the settlement (Option 3).  To our 
knowledge, however, the HIPC rules did not confide to the sovereign debtors 
how they were to achieve this if a creditor/beneficiary simply declined the 
offer.  
At least one country has chosen Option 4 (promise equal 
treatment of the creditor whenever the guarantee may be called).  Grenada, 
in its debt restructuring of 2005, had outstanding government guarantees in 
an amount equal to 10% of the country’s total stock of debt.  Grenada could 
not legally force the beneficiaries to call on the guarantees, but it did 
expressly warn the beneficiaries that they should expect no better treatment 
if they elected to stay out of the restructuring and call on the guarantee after 
the restructuring closed.  As described in a 2006 article: 
                                            
10
 The telex sent by Mexico addressed to “The International Banking Community” on 
December 8, 1982 (at the very beginning of the global debt crisis of the 1980s) contained 
draft “Restructure Principles”.  The debt subject to the restructuring referred to principal 
maturities falling due within a specified time period, “but, in the case of any Debt which 
arises from a guarantee, endorsement, aval or similar instrument, only such payment 
obligations which are invoked and payable” during that time period.  This practice appears to 
have been followed by the other sovereign debt restructurings of that era. 
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Grenada’s solution to this dilemma had three 
elements11:  
 
● Beneficiaries of all government guarantees 
were given the option to call upon their 
guarantees at any time prior to the expiration date 
of the [restructuring exchange] offer.  The face 
amount of any guarantee called by a beneficiary 
would then be exchanged, at par, for the new 
bonds being issued in the exchange. 
● A beneficiary calling a guarantee in these 
circumstances was required to subrogate the 
Government to all of the beneficiary’s claims 
against the primary obligor and any collateral 
securing the debt of the underlying project. 
● If a beneficiary elected not to call on a 
government guarantee during the offer period, 
however, the disclosure document for the 
exchange warned that any subsequent call on the 
guarantee would be discharged by the delivery to 
the beneficiary of the same bonds being issued in 
the exchange on terms comparable to those 
reflected in the exchange offer (or, at the 
Government’s option, by delivery of other 
consideration having an equivalent value). 
The Greek Case 
In the spring of 2012, the Hellenic Republic restructured 
approximately €206 billion of its bond indebtedness in the hands of private 
sector creditors, the largest sovereign debt restructuring in history.  More 
than 130 separate series of bonds were declared eligible to participate in this 
restructuring including 36 series of bonds bearing the express guarantee of 
the Hellenic Republic.  The Hellenic Republic offered no special 
compensation (over and above the consideration offered to holders of direct 
Hellenic Republic bonds) to the holders of guaranteed bonds in return for the 
surrender of the holders’ claims against the primary obligors, nor were any 
contractual measures taken to coerce the holders of the guaranteed bonds 
into participating in the transaction. 
                                            
11
 See Lee C. Buchheit & Elizabeth Karpinski, Grenada’s Innovations, 4 J. INT’L BANKING AND 
REG. 227, 231 (2006). 
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At the time of this debt restructuring, the Hellenic Republic had 
put its guarantee on hundreds of outstanding debt instruments (loans and 
bonds), but only 36 were declared eligible to participate in the 2012 
restructuring.  One of the criteria used by the Republic to select these 36 
series of bonds was their classification by Eurostat (the statistical office of 




What preventive measures could a sovereign take to deal with 
this problem?  One possible step would be for the sovereign to insert into its 
standard form of guarantee a contractual provision to the effect that the 
guarantee will be deemed automatically called (or will be callable at the 
option of the sovereign guarantor) in the event of the announcement of a 
generalized debt restructuring by the sovereign.  We have never seen such a 
provision, however, and we doubt whether it would be well received by 
prospective beneficiaries of the guarantees. 
Alternatively, a sovereign could attempt to preserve the 
economics of “two-name paper” by telling a beneficiary who joins the 
sovereign’s debt restructuring that if the exercise by the sovereign of its 
subrogation rights against the primary obligor produces a recovery after the 
restructuring closes, the proceeds of that recovery will be paid first to the 
beneficiary up to the amount of the financial loss it realized by joining the 
restructuring, and thereafter to the sovereign.  The exercise of these 
subrogation rights, however, ought logically to be placed in the hands of a 
third party such as a trustee.  The sovereign cannot be trusted to pursue the 
primary obligor aggressively (particularly if it is a state-owned enterprise), 
while the beneficiary would have no economic incentive to pursue a primary 
obligor to recover anything more than the beneficiary itself could claim as its 
make-whole amount. 
A third option would be for the sovereign to include in its 
guarantees some form of collective action clause that would permit a 
supermajority of the beneficiaries of that guarantee to agree to a settlement 
of the guarantee as part of the sovereign’s main debt restructuring.  A 
decision taken pursuant to such a collective action clause would then bind 
any dissenting beneficiaries of the guarantee. 
* * * * 
